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The government, buoyed by the law to recapture the real economy, the 
Florange act, which establishes the possibility of double voting for patient 
shareholders (who have held their shares at least two years), has just taken 
two significant decisions by temporarily increasing its holdings in the capital of 
Renault and Air France in order to ensure that in a general shareholders 
meeting the double voting option is not rejected by the qualified majority 
authorized under the law. The objective spelled out by France’s Minister of the 
Economy in Le Monde is to help “recapture the industrial spirit of capitalism” by 
favouring long-term commitments in order to promote investment that will 
foster solid growth. 
Under the impulse of the Florange law, that has recently introduced the 
institute of the double voting for ‘patient’ shareholders (shareholders who have 
held their company’s shares for at least two years), the government has taken 
the important decision of increasing temporarily its equity shares into two 
major French companies:  Renault and Air France. 
The increased government’s stake into the two companies aims at preventing 
attempts of the shareholders general assembly to block the adoption of the 
double voting institute, which would require the approval of a qualified 
majority. The France’s Minister of the Economy explained in Le Monde that the 
government’s action is intended to help “revive the industrial spirit of 
capitalism” by favouring long-term commitments that promote investments 
and foster robust growth. 
This initiative has led to renewed discussions about the governance of joint-
stock companies and corporations (Pollin, 2004, 2006), to consider the 
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problems that afflict them, possible remedies, and what one could expect from 
the government. 
Because corporations have the ability to attract abundant savings and because 
of their power in choosing where to direct these savings, they are undeniably 
at the heart of the investment process. They can be governed in various ways, 
depending on the institutional contexts, which are related in turn to significant 
differences in productivity and growth (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010 ; De 
Nicolo’, Laeven and Ueda, 2008 ; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2000). So the question arises as to which governance model is best 
able to promote entrepreneurial activity and innovation, and thus ultimately to 
ensure growth (OECD 2012). 
There is evidence that the big corporations do not suffer from a lack of long-
term financing. The development of the stock and bond markets since the 
1980s has allowed corporations to reduce their dependence on bank financing 
and its cyclical character. Investment problems thus mainly reflect major 
breakdowns in the governance of companies, whether large, medium or small, 
as well as in the governance of financial institutions (Giovannini et al., 2015). 
Traditionally, the focus has been on the ways controlling shareholders’ choose 
managers, i.e. the conditions under which the capital owners get the yield on 
their investment that is justified by their special position as residual claimant 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). But this ignores that other company stakeholders 
(creditors, employees, suppliers or even customers) also incur risk, and that 
the long-term performance of the company depends on the conditions in which 
the shareholders’ engagement controls the commitment of the other 
stakeholders (Mayer, 2013). It is not certain, in this regard, that the 
distribution of voting rights between different classes of shareholders is 
decisive. 
Control and engagement 
The central issue is how capital owners affect management’s decision-making. 
Thus, the goals and values of family businesses reflect the interests and 
inclinations of the family owners, which can become inconsistent with 
productive efficiency, especially with the rise of rentier capitalism, when it is no 
longer the founders who are at the head of the company but their heirs or, 
more surreptitiously, a self-perpetuating caste (Philippon, 2007). While there is 
a positive relationship between the wealth of self-made millionaires and GDP 
and growth, the relationship to GDP turns negative when this concerns the 
wealth of millionaire heirs (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 2000). Faced with 
this potential problem, the existence of dispersed ownership would seem to be 
beneficial in so far as it replaces special interests with what can be likened to a 
collective interest. 
This vision of the corporation nevertheless faces an objection formulated by 
Berle and Means (1932), who view the separation between ownership and 
control as a source of inefficiency. It creates problems of agency, meaning that 
the managers are likely to act in their own interests rather than in those of the 
shareholders, just like families or owning castes. Empirically, the Tobin’s Q (the 
ratio of capital’s market value to its replacement cost) increases, then 
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decreases before increasing again as the power of the managers grows 
(Morck et al., 1988). It is then possible that shareholders have less incentive to 
subscribe new shares or keep the ones they hold, resulting in lower share 
prices and less access by companies to external financing. The provisions that 
make it possible to protect large enterprises can have the effect of hindering 
the market entry of new businesses and introducing significant distortions into 
the investment decision-making of established firms (Iacopetta, Minetti and 
Peretto, 2015). 
Solving these problems requires creating institutional arrangements to ensure 
that shareholders become active in corporate management. 
These arrangements have involved improving the quality of audits, of risk 
management and of communications between the company and its 
shareholders. They have led to greater transparency in executive compensation 
policy and linking pay to performance. This process has spurred the 
development of “markets for corporate control” and for shareholder activism, 
and indeed of a particular class of shareholders consisting of investment funds, 
including pension funds, whose management methods (the delegation of 
investment decisions to fund managers) emphasizes the immediate 
performance of their portfolios. 
In the light of the financial crisis, these arrangements seem questionable to 
say the least (Giovannini et al., 2015). Financial institutions, although subject 
to the “best” governance rules ensuring genuine shareholder control, have 
been scenes of conflict between shareholders who have benefited from upside 
positive performance and creditors (and taxpayers) who have had to bear any 
losses. What was true of the financial institutions also held true for 
manufacturing companies, which have been arenas of conflict between 
shareholders and the other stakeholders (creditors, employees, suppliers and 
customers). 
The real problem is that the while arrangements that were designed to solve 
agency problems have strengthened the control exercised by shareholders over 
company management, they have also reduced the shareholders’ level of 
engagement (Mayer, 2013). 
Notwithstanding their particular interests, family owners can ensure a stability 
and long-term engagement vis-à-vis other stakeholders that is not guaranteed 
by dispersed shareholding. The same is true of managers with delegated 
authority who have acquired sufficient independence vis-à-vis the shareholders 
to be open not only to their own interests but also to the interests of the 
employees (and sub-contractors). After all, the constitution of industrial 
empires is far from a bad thing so long as they are economically viable and do 
not violate the rules of competition. But the advantages conferred on managers 
are being offset by the development of markets for corporate control and 
shareholder activism, which has led to judging managerial effectiveness on the 
grounds of current performance. There is indeed a trade-off between the 
requirements of control and engagement. The problem is perhaps not so much 
to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders as to make 
shareholders responsible for what happens in the long run to the companies in 
which they invest. 
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The measure of engagement 
The degree of commitment of financiers, lenders and shareholders is critical 
since it determines that of the other stakeholders in the company. It is 
reflected in the attitude chosen in response to fluctuations in performance, and 
more specifically in the degree of tolerance of poor business results. A low 
tolerance is a sign of a low degree of engagement, and usually a sign of hostile 
takeovers and pension fund activism. 
It is also necessary to agree on the meaning of poor results. This could be the 
result of bad management, in which case investors’ power to provide financing 
conditioned on management’s ability to make the changes they require does 
not necessarily indicate a lesser degree of engagement. It may even prevent 
the financial crises that could result from serious agency problems – at least if 
consistent performance is the norm. But this is exactly not the case when the 
relevant industrial activities have a cyclical dimension. Companies can deal 
with this by offsetting the results of several activities against each other 
provided that their cycles are different. But the attitude of investment funds is 
to emphasize the diversification of their portfolio on the valuation of the 
diversification of their activities by the companies themselves, prompting the 
latter to refocus on what is sometimes described as their core business. A 
series of dismantling operations, in particular, in the cases of Alstom, Alcatel 
and Thomson, constituted one of the reasons for the deindustrialization seen in 
France (Beffa, 2012). 
Nor does the consistency of performance prevail when companies choose to 
innovate by introducing new products or new production techniques and 
exploring new markets. Because firms incur the costs long before increased in 
revenue, these are irrevocable costs, that is to say, whose recovery is 
contingent on the success of the decision to innovate (“sunk costs”). Any form 
of governance that would have the effect of favouring immediate results and 
eliminating tolerance of a temporarily poor performance would then only hold 
back innovation by penalizing long-term investment. But this is exactly where 
the possibility of hostile takeovers and the activism of investment funds are 
leading. 
The institutional prescriptions 
The debate has thus been opened on the ins and outs of the conflict between 
different classes of shareholders established in relation to the volume of 
securities held and the length they are held (Samama and Bolton, 2012). Many 
companies have adopted mechanisms that financially reward shareholders’ 
loyalty or that grant them additional voting rights in return for this loyalty. 
Some countries (France and Italy in particular) have legislated in this regard. It 
is difficult to assess the results. In theory, the principle of “one share – one 
vote” does not rule out the existence of several classes of shares involving 
different voting rights. It does of course reduce the agency problems involving 
the holders of blocs of shares, but it also reduces the beneficial effects of the 
stability that these blocs provide (Burkart and Lee, 2008). Moreover, empirical 
studies reach mixed conclusions, further indicating the complexity of the 
problem (Adams and Ferreira, 2008). 
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Nevertheless, numerous empirical studies do confirm that companies that have 
a more stable ownership structure and meet performance indicators that do 
not refer merely to financial capital have better outcomes in the long run (Clark 
et al., 2014). The existence of stable shareholder blocs or of restrictions on 
voting rights may be mechanisms that are likely to ensure this sustainability 
and strengthen the degree of commitment made by the capital providers, 
thereby justifying that other stakeholders – employees, suppliers and 
customers – do likewise in turn. 
The difficulty with mechanisms for restricting voting rights is that they do not 
allow shareholders to indicate the length of time that they want to keep their 
shares and to indicate their level of engagement (Mayer, 2013). In fact, those 
who intend to hold their shares only briefly (possibly milliseconds in case of 
high-frequency trading) have the same influence on managers’ decisions as 
those who intend to keep their shares for many years. The first bear the 
consequences of their votes only momentarily, unlike the latter, but both have 
the same influence on current decision-making, which may affect the 
company’s performance for a long time to come. Basically, establishing 
different classes of shares does not necessarily substitute for the constitution 
of a stable bloc of shareholders that is able to deal with hostile takeovers 
motivated by the quest for short-term capital gains. 
Things may be different when past loyalty is rewarded financially by an 
increase in the dividends paid, since in this case selling the shares leads to 
losing the financial advantage acquired. There is therefore an incentive to hold 
the shares even longer. Nevertheless, the payment of dividends is never 
equivalent to the retention of profits. The proceeds from new issues are under 
the control of the shareholders, whereas undistributed profits are still under 
the control of the managers. The higher the dividends, the more companies are 
dependent on their ability to draw on the stock market. There is still an issue of 
too much dependence vis-à-vis impatient shareholders, pulling companies 
towards short-term investments. 
Accordingly, one potential relevant mechanism might be to establish voting 
rights based not on the time the shares have been held, but on the future 
period to which the shareholders are committed (Mayer, 2013). Under this 
proposal, shareholders would be able to register the period for which they 
intend to hold their shares and to be paid in the form of votes that are set 
according to the length of time remaining before they are able to dispose of 
them. At the moment, “loyalty and the double vote of the shares remunerate 
shareholders for the period the shares have been held and, consequently, fail 
to make them more responsible for the future consequences of their decisions. 
Really, since shareholders who have held their shares a long time are more 
likely to sell them, this potentially rewards a lack of commitment” (Mayer, 
2013, pp. 208-9). It is clear, however, that it would be difficult to implement 
this institutional arrangement in practice, not least due to its credibility, and it 
would be preferable to explore other forms of governance that involve other 
stakeholders in the decision-making process. 
On the expectations of government 
In light of the analysis above, the question arises of what the government can 
expect from its decision to impose double voting rights. The answer is that this 
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could be mainly to reduce, even if in a limited way, the public debt, without 
losing its influence in the companies in which it holds shares. The intention to 
revive industrial capitalism by this measure, laudable as this may be, is 
unlikely to have any real impact. This is true in particular because there is 
nothing to suggest that in the future the State would behave differently from 
any other shareholder, despite double voting rights, and could impose or 
contribute to imposing management decisions that are not necessarily in the 
long-term interest of the companies and their stakeholders. 
Also, without wishing to neglect what the existence of several classes of action 
could mean for making decisions about business strategy, including possibly 
introducing protection against hostile takeovers, it seems a more fundamental 
measure would be to revise the business model as a whole. 
The degree of engagement of the capital providers commands the commitment 
of the other stakeholders. Intermediated financing is the primary source of 
funds for owners who want to keep control of their business. It enables 
companies to innovate and grow without the need to dilute ownership. But it is 
necessary for such financing to exist, i.e. for banks to commit over a long term 
to these companies. Yet banks too are afflicted with problems of governance, 
leading to a conflict between the two main types of investors, shareholders and 
creditors (Giovannini et al., 2015). If institutional progress is to take place, it 
should therefore concern the financial system and be based on a return of 
intermediation (Pollin 2006). And if action is to be taken on the conditions of 
governance of the corporations themselves, this should be based on the 
proposals by Mayer (2013): perhaps, subject to feasibility, by instituting voting 
rights in proportion to the time for which shares are held in the future, but 
especially by establishing “boards of trustees” that set broad guidelines, acting 
as the guardians of values common to the various stakeholders (shareholders, 
creditors, employees and even suppliers and customers ) instead of acting 
merely as representatives of the shareholders. These common values do 
nothing more than express the recognition of the strategic complementarities 
that exist between all the actors who are the source of value creation. 
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